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"THE PHOENIX PHILLIES v. THE PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES":
A RECENTLY DISCOVERED OPINION ON
"BASEBALL" AND THE
"ANTITRUST" EXEMPTION
Students of late twentieth century law now suffer from the lack of accu-
rate records that arose when so much of the legal materials of the time were
put on "computers." Even the term "computers" is something of a puzzle as,
so far as we know, most legal materials had nothing to do with computation,
and with the loss of such devices we have rather little idea why so much of
the legal materials of the time were "computerized." Be that as it may, we do
know that computerization led to the neglect of written records. As a result,
the loss of the "computers" has posed a real problem for historians generally,
and for legal historians in particular. Still, sometimes we discover court
opinions that puzzle and intrigue us. The following is such an opinion.
I recently uncovered the following hitherto unpublished opinion during
my excavations in the region formerly called Pennsylvania. Among the
many puzzles in this opinion is its origination in the Twelfth Circuit, a
court of which we have no other record - indeed, I do not find any other
reference to this court in other legal materials. Nor do we have a precise date
for the opinion, although the internal references indicate that it was probably
delivered in 1996 or 1997. I publish the opinion here in full because, even
with its arcane references to an obscure game, its style and structure are
unusual, although not entirely unprecedented. In particular, we have parts
of the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Flood v. Kuhn,* referred to
in this case. In Flood, the style of the opinion is somewhat similar,
although the structure of that opinion appears to be altogether more
traditional.
The opinion published below clearly attempts to reflect the flow of the
game that forms the subject matter of the dispute. Apart from Flood and the
case published below, we know very little about this game which once appar-
ently was so central to the lives of our ancestors. The international impor-
tance of the game is suggested by records indicating that "Babe Ruth" was
used as some sort of battle cry by the Japanese during their war against the
United States, even though these two cases clearly indicate that she was an
American. Her name also turns up on a candy bar, the recipe for which has
survived to this day. Whether she invented the recipe for that bar, owned the
company that made it, or was simply being honored in some strange way is
unknown. As we cannot determine the source or significance of such iso-
* 407 U.S. 278 (1972).
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lated facts, it is no wonder that some of the terms used in the opinion below
remain puzzles. For example, does anyone know what the term "line score"
signifies? And what is an "infield fly" and what possible role could an
insect play in "the national pastime"?
Both Flood and the following case deal with the issue of whether pro-
fessional sports leagues, that generate almost unimaginable amounts of
money, should be subjected to the same government regulations as were ap-
plied to other businesses of the time. The sort of regulation in question is
almost as puzzling as the game involved in the disputes. We are entirely
unclear why the government should seek to ban "trust" from business con-
duct. Perhaps these laws reflect the rule of caveat emptor that some histori-
ans insist was the guiding law of the marketplace until our own enlightened
times. The following case in particular gives us a much clearer picture of
that area of law, demonstrating that the caveat emptor theory is not cor-
rect. Much work remains to be done to develop adequately the full scope and
significance of "antitrust" law. Nothing in this case helps to clarify the
puzzle of the name of this area of law.
For myself, I am drawn to a somewhat different problem presented by
these opinions. The opinion that follows suggests that if we can understand
the game, we can understand our ancestors. Even allowing for a certain
customary hyperbole in the opinion, it seems worth the effort to attempt to
recapture the nature and history of the game. I propose to do so using these
two cases as starting points, while searching through other records for addi-
tional information. We know that the game had something to do with
diamonds, but we do not know how they were used. Nor do we know if other
jewels were used in the game. The role of diamonds and the amounts of
money involved in the case below suggest that an important aspect of the
game was the materialism for which that era is known. I would welcome
any information others might be able to provide in this effort. Who knows,
we might even enjoy playing the game if it really is as fascinating as so many
apparently thought at one time.
Joseph W Dellapenna**
September 28, 2424
** Professor of Law at Villanova University. B.B.A., University of Michigan
(1965);J.D., Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International & Com-
parative Law, George Washington University (1969); LL.M., Columbia University
(1974). A somewhat different form of this article was used as the problem for an
intramural moot court problem at the Villanova University School of Law in 1994-
95. Appreciation is due to ProfessorJames Maule, who commented on the several
drafts of this article.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
)
The PHOENIX PHILLIES, INC. ))
Appellant, )
v.
) No. 96-7075
The NATIONAL LEAGUE OF BASEBALL CLUBS, )
INC., the PHILADELPHIA NATIONAL BASE- )
BALL CLUB, and PHILADELPHIA BASEBALL )
RENAISSANCE, INC. )
Appellees )
Before KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS, Chief Judge, A.B.
CHANDLER, Circuit Judge, and FORD FRICK, District Judge sit-
ting by designation.
LANDIS, Chief Judge:
I. THE LINE SCORE
This case comes to us on an appeal from the order of District
Judge William Eckert entering a summary judgment in favor of the
appellees. The appeal arises from a suit brought by the Phoenix
Phillies, Inc., against the present owners of the several baseball
clubs in the National League in general and two groups whom the
League recognizes as the past and present owners of the Philadel-
phia Phillies - the Philadelphia National League Baseball Club,
Inc., and the Philadelphia Baseball Renaissance, Inc. This case
raises questions about the purported exemption of professional or
"organized" baseball from the application of the antitrust laws of
this nation and, upon our finding that the industry is no longer
immune, of whether the activities of the National League of Base-
ball Clubs, Inc., are the operations of a single business entity that
therefore cannot constitute an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade.
This suit grows out of the abortive sale of the team known as the
Philadelphia Phillies to a corporation that now styles itself the
Phoenix Phillies, Inc.
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Our opinion opens with the field on which the events giving
rise to this suit were (and are to be) played out, followed by the
line-up of players, and a play-by-play description of the events lead-
ing up to this litigation. The facts as set forth in this admittedly
lengthy introduction are taken from the stipulations of the parties,
or from information known to any knowledgeable baseball fan.
The latter facts are sufficiently well-known and such a matter of
public record that we take judicial notice of them. After setting
forth these undisputed facts, we proceed to the disputed call by the
trial judge, the official ruling of this court and the protest to that
ruling by a dissenting member of this court.
II. THE FIELD OF PLAY
Litigation has often been described through analogies to sport-
ing contests. The metaphor is particularly well-suited to this case.
As in all sporting contests, one must begin by becoming familiar
with the field of play. Here the field is the arcane lore of baseball as
a special institution in the American life and psyche. As we shall
see, so special is the sport of baseball that it has received unique
treatment under the law controlling this litigation. More than a few
jurists and commentators have decried the resulting privileged sta-
tus of professional baseball, a status that undoubtedly has contrib-
uted to the current malaise afflicting the sport in general, a malaise
that has converted many a fan's field of dreams into a field of
screams.
Baseball, that uniquely American invention, is a game of time
and memory, redolent of home, of family, of civic pride and of per-
sonal and communal disappointment. Baseball originated on the
playing fields of northern New Jersey before the Civil War, grew
into the national sport during that conflict and emerged after the
war as the first sport in the world to have professional athletic
teams. Today, children and adults alike still thrill to the now collec-
tive memories conjured up by names such as Hank Aaron, Grover
Cleveland Alexander, Walter Alston, Sparky Anderson, Cap Anson,
Ernie Banks, Johnny Bench, Yogi Berra, Vida Blue, Wade Boggs,
Tommy Bond, Ken Boyer, George Brett, Lou Brock, Dan
Brouthers, Three-Finger Brown, Pete Browning (the "Louisville
Slugger"), Roy Campanella, Max Carey, Steve Carlton, Joe Carter,
Jack Chesbro, John Clarkson, Roger Clemens, Roberto Clemente,
Rod Carew, Ty Cobb, Mickey Cochrane, Eddie Collins, Sam Craw-
ford, Dizzy Dean (and his brother Daffy), Ed Delahanty, Bill Dickey,
Joe DiMaggio, Bobby Doerr, Don Drysdale, Hugh Duffy, Bob Feller,
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Whitey Ford, Nellie Fox, Jimmy Foxx ("Double X"), Frankie Frisch,
Steve Garvey, Lou Gehrig, Bob Gibson, Lefty Gomez, Dwight
Gooden, Goose Goslin, Hank Greenberg, Lefty Grove, Tony
Gwynn, Rickie Henderson, Gil Hodges, Rogers Hornsby, Dummy
Hoy (a deaf person for whom the first - and still standard - sys-
tem of sports hand signals was invented to enable him to play), Carl
Hubbell, Catfish Hunter, ReggieJackson, Shoeless Joe Jackson, Fer-
guson Jenkins, Walter Johnson, Wee Willie Keeler, King Kelly, Har-
mon Killebrew, Ralph Kiner, Chuck Klein, Sandy Koufax, Nap
Lajoie, Bob Lemon, Connie Mack, Greg Maddox, Mickey Mantle,
Juan Marichal, Roger Maris, Pepper Martin, Christy Mathewson,
Eddie Matthews, Willie Mays, Joe McCarthy, Willie McCovey, John
McGraw, Denny McLain, Minnie Minoso, Dale Murphy, Stan "the
Man" Musial, Joe and Phil Niekro, Don Newcombe, Hal
Newhouser, Kid Nichols, Jim O'Rourke, Mel Ott, Jim Palmer, Gay-
lord and Jim Perry, Eddie Plank, Kirby Puckett, Old Hoss
Radbourne, Jim Rice, Branch Rickey, Cal Ripken, Robin Roberts,
Brooks Robinson, Jackie Robinson, Frank Robinson, Pete Rose,
Schoolboy Rowe, Red Ruffing, Amos Rusie, Babe Ruth, Nolan Ryan,
Ryne Sandberg, Mike Schmidt, Tom Seaver, Al Simmons, Duke
Snider, Warren Spahn, Tris Speaker, Willie Stargell, Casey Stengel,
Don Sutton, Pie Traynor, Fernando Valenzuela, Rube Waddell,
Honus Wagner, Ed Walsh, Monte Ward, Earl Weaver, Hoyt Wil-
helm, Ted Williams, Maury Wills, Hack Wilson, Early Wynn, Carl
Yastrzemski, Cy Young and Robin Yount. The list is indeed endless.
In their day, these players, pitchers and managers (and many
more) were better known to more people than most public office-
holders. Today their exploits are remembered (and studied) in
greater detail by devotees who considerably outnumber the histori-
ans and political scientists who study the accomplishments of our
greatest statesmen. We have even seen a law review dedicate an
issue to Mickey Mantle after his death. JohnJ. Dabney, Mickey Man-
tle: An American Legend, 7 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 1 (1997). With a
history of more than 125 years, many of the old-time players are
now merely names on paper, of whom few of us have any personal
recollection; yet they are storied in verse, song, fiction and the copi-
ously detailed statistical records that fascinate many of us, to the
occasional dismay of others. Baseball has been the backdrop, and
more, for movies from the silent era to such classics as Joe E.
Brown's bringing to life Ring Lardner's "Alibi Ike" in 1933, "Death
on the Diamond" in 1934, Gary Cooper as Lou Gehrig in 1941's
"Pride of the Yankees," the charming 1951 original of "Angels in
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the Outfield" or 1958's "Fear Strikes Out." More recently, audi-
ences have been delighted by films such as "The Bad News Bears,"
"The Natural," "Field of Dreams," "Bull Durham," "A League of
Their Own," "Eight Men Out," "Mr. Baseball," and "Major League
(I, II & III)." Indeed, in 1994, Ken Burn's "Baseball" treated us to
an eighteen-hour documentary on the history of the game.
The hold of baseball on the national imagination has been
captured by such comments as those of Walt Whitman, who once
called baseball as important an institution to the molding of our
nation as our Constitution, or of French philosopher Jacque
Barzun, that "whoever wants to know the mind and heart of
America ha[d] better learn baseball." Thomas Picher, Baseball's An-
titrust Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the Effects on Salary Cap and
Salary Taxation Provisions, 7 Seton Hall. J. Sport L. 5, 6 (1997). The
accuracy of such comments is manifest in the many artistic repre-
sentations of baseball games, players or events. There have been
poems, stories and novels focusing on the sport. The examples are
so numerous there is hardly any point to citing them. They include
the novels on which several of the above referenced movies were
based. There are also many reputable histories of the sport.1 Even
the legal imagination has been captured by the sport. There is of
course a small body of legal literature specifically directed to the
legal status of baseball, principally regarding the very issues in-
volved in this case. 2
1. See ROGER ANGELL, ONCE MORE AROUND THE PARK: A BASEBALL READER
(1991); ROBERT F. BURK, NEVER JUST A GAME: PLAYERS, OWNERS, AND AMERICAN
BASEBALL TO 1920 (1994); JOSEPH DURSO, BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
(1986); PETER GOLENBOCK, BUMS: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE BROOKLYN DODGERS
(1984); KENNETH M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES: THE MONEY GAME IN PROFES-
SIONAL BASEBALL (1990); ROGER KAHN, THE Boys OF SUMMER (1972); ROGER KAHN,
THE ERA, 1947-1957: WHEN THE YANKEES, THE NEW YORK GIANTS & THE BROOKLYN
DODGERS RULED THE WORLD (1993); RON MCCULLOCH, How BASEBALL BEGAN: THE
LONG OVERDUE TRUTH ABOUT THE BIRTH OF BASEBALL (1995); HAROLD SEYMOUR,
BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS (1960); HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE
(1971); JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND His
LEGACY (1983); DAVID Q. VOICT, AMERICAN BASEBALL: FROM GENTLEMAN'S SPORT TO
THE COMMISSIONER SYSTEM (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, CREATING THE NATIONAL PAS-
TIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF, 1903-1953 (1996); GEORGE F. WILL, MEN AT
WORK: THE CRAFT OF BASEBALL (1990).
2. See Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's
Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 209 (1983); Richard B.
Blackwell, Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an
Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859 (1971); Alison Cackowski, Congress Drops
the Ball Again: Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Remains in Place, 5 J. ART. & ENT. L. 147
(1994); H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369 (1988); Michael J. Cozzillio,
From the Land of Bondage: The Greening of Major League Baseball Players and the Major
League Baseball Players Association, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 117 (1991) (book review);
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More interesting as an expression of the importance of the
sport is the burgeoning legal literature that uses baseball as a meta-
phor for law or legal issues, or even as models for the major social
changes of the last decades. 3 There is even a small but impressive
John Dodge, Regulating the Baseball Monopoly: One Suggestion for Governing the Game,
5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 35 (1995); Julie Dorst, Franchise Relocation: Reconsidering
Major League Baseball's Carte Blanche Control, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 553 (1994);
Mark T. Gould, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch Gets Closer and Closer, 5 SE-
TON HALLJ. SPORT L. 273 (1995); Y. Shukie Grossman, Note, Antitrust and Baseball
- A League of Their Own, 4 FOR IHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 563 (1993);
Michael H. Juarez, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
737 (1995); Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's Antitrust Exemption It's Going, Going...
Gone!, 20 NovA L. Rv. 1231 (1996); Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and
the Continuing Vitality of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Review ofPiazza
v. Major League Baseball, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1271 (1994); John S. Lockman,
Note, Baseball as Interstate Commerce Within the Meaning of the Antitrust Laws, 5 INTRA-
MURAL L. Rv. 206 (1950); Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Tri-
umph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball 35 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1982);
Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball's Three
Antitrust Exemptions, 2 Viu. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 213 (1995); John J. Mc-
Quaide, Note, Curt Flood at Bat Against Baseball's "Reserve Clause," 8 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 92 (1971); Barton J. Menitove, Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The
Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 737 (1971); MatthewJ. Mitten
& Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Pub-
lic Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need
for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57 (1997);John W. Neville, Baseball and the
Antitrust Laws, 16 FoRDHAM L. REv. 208 (1947); Thomas Picher, Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption Repealed: An Analysis of the Effects on Salary Cap and Salary Taxation Provi-
sions, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5 (1997); Gary R. Roberts, On the Scope and Effect of
Baseball's Antitrust Exclusion, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 321 (1994); Thane N. Rosen-
baum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729 (1987); Stephen Ross, The Misun-
derstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 519; Anthony Sica, Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Out of the Pennant Race
Since 1972, 7 FoRDHAM IrNrEI. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 295 (1996); Larry C. Smith,
Comment, Beyond Peanuts and Crackerjack: The Implications of Lifting Baseball's Anti-
trust Exemption, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 113 (1996); Stephanie L. Taylor, Baseball as an
Anomaly: American Major League Baseball Antitrust Exemption - Is the Australian Model
a Solution?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 359 (1995); Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Eco-
nomics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 287 (1994).
3. See, e.g., 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., The Law of Torts § 21.5, at 238-44 (2d
ed. 1986) (discussing assumption of risk); BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
MIND (Spencer Walker, Neil Cohen, & Paul Finkelman eds. 1995); LLOYD L. WEIN-
REB, OEDIPUS AT FENWAY PARR: WHAT RIGHTS ARE AND WHY THERE ARE ANY (1994);
Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE LJ. 1807, 1840, 1847
(1997) (explaining rules of double jeopardy by analogy to interrupted baseball
games); William Araiza ET AL., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697
(1997); Christopher H. Clancy &Jonathan A. Weiss, A Pine Tar Gloss on Quasi-Legal
Images, 5 CAMRozo L. REv. 411 (1984);James R. Devine, The Past as Moral Guide to
the Present: The Parallel Between Martin Luther King Jr. 's Elements of a Nonviolent Civil
Rights Campaign and Jackie Robinson's Entry Onto the Brooklyn Dodgers, 3 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L. FORUM 489 (1996); Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Comment, In re Brett: The
Sticky Problem of Statutory Construction, 52 Fortnwv L. REv. 430 (1983); Stanley Fish,
DennisMartinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 1773 (1987);John W. Frost, II, If
We Built It. . . ,71 FLA. B.J. 8 (1997);John H. Garvey, Is There a Principle of Religious
7
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body of literature on the jurisprudential lessons to be drawn from
the infield fly rule. 4 It even turns out that the adoption of the first
Canons of Judicial Ethics was a reaction to the refusal of Judge Ken-
nesaw Mountain Landis to resign from the bench after he was se-
lected as the first Commissioner of Baseball. See Stephen Gillers &
Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 549
(1997); John P. MacKenzie, The Appearance ofJustice 180-82 (1974).
Only rarely has someone criticized the recourse to baseball imagery
in legal reasoning. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Sub-
stantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 Conn. L.
Rev. 17, 18 (1994) ("The fact that baseball metaphors have not
Liberty?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1379, 1390-91 (1996) (comparing reproductive freedom
to hypothetical freedom to play baseball); Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction
of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verite and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 347 (1996) (analyzing symbolic significance of use of baseball bat as
instrument of murder); Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of
Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1 (1993); Douglas 0. Linder, Strict Construction and the
Strike Zone, 56 UMKC L. REv. 117 (1987); Joseph Lukinsky, Law in Education: A
Reminiscence with Some Footnotes to Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 96 YALE L.J.
1836, 1855-56 (1987) ("The argument [over George Brett's pine tar incident] con-
stituted perhaps the most widespread popular legal debate in American history.");
J. Daniel Mahoney, Thoughts on Originalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1225, 1230
(1997); Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law,
44 VAND. L. REv. 827 (1991); Robert Martin, Mediation - Schmediation - Let's Play
Ball, 16 AM. BANR. INST.J. 34 (1997); L.A. Powe,Jr., What Does Bo Know?, 82 VA. L.
REv. 1369 (1996); Stephen Pressman &Jennifer Kaae, Three Strikes, 16 CAL. LAw. 33
(1996); DonaldJ. Rapson, A "Home Run" Application of Established Principles of Statu-
tory Construction: U.C.C. Analogies, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 441 (1984); Margaret G.
Robb, Running Bases, Winning Cases: Why the Grand Old Game of Baseball Is Much Like
the Legal Profession, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1996, at 140; Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of
Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 833, 836-37 (1997); Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-
Out" - Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYrON L. REv. 717
(1995); Brook Thomas, Stanley Fish and the Uses of Baseball: The Return of the Natural,
2 YALEJ.L. & HutmN. 59 (1990); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., A Critique of the Califor-
nia Civil Rights Initiative, 14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 181, 193-94 (1997) (discussing base-
ball as demonstrating need for affirmative action); Donald A. Winslow & Seth C.
Anderson, From "Shoeless"Joe Jackson to Ivan Boesky: A Sporting Response to Law and
Economics Criticism of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 81 Ky. L.J. 295 (1993); Steven
L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639 (1990); Charles
Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227
(1994).
4. See Kessler v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 248, 249 (5th
Cir. 1976); Security Union Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 281 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353
(1991); Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474
(1975); Margaret Berger, Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing:
Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENT. REP.
96 (1992); Mark Cochran, The Infield Fly Rule and the Internal Revenue Code: An Even
Further Aside, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 567 (1988); P.C. Doherty, A Quodlibet, a
Mumpsimus, and the Rule of Infield Flies: The Unfinished Business of Term Limits in
Florida, 18 NovA L. REv. 921 (1994);JohnJ. Flynn, Further Aside: A Comment on "The
Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule," 4J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978).
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been employed in any systematic fashion does not mean that they
can do no harm.").
The ease with which occasional legal scholars refer to baseball
events as part of the common knowledge of the community is per-
haps the most eloquent illustration of the importance of the game.
For example, David Currie felt comfortable introducing his article,
The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiy, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
466 (1983), with the following:
Insignificance, as every Chicago Cub supporter knows, is
in the eye of the beholder. Yet every baseball town has its
particular favorites: the shortstop who regularly threw the
ball into the lower grandstand; the pitcher who habitually
walked batters when the bases were loaded; the slugger
who struck out whenever he came up with men on base.
Nor, one might add, is there any sport in which such appar-
ently normal persons could excel. While any sport might have its
"Dizzies" or its "King Kong," only in baseball are there genuine all-
stars with nicknames such as "Pee-Wee," "Skeeter" or "Tiny" without
being ironic. One could go on for pages just ruminating over ac-
tual baseball nicknames, such as "Lady," "Schoolboy" or "She."
One does not even dare to attempt to compile a list ofjudicial opin-
ions in which baseball metaphors played a significant role. See
Oldfather, supra; Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come:
Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and the "Sex Stuff," 28 Conn. L.
Rev. 813 (1996).
Regrettably, baseball recently has been more notable for the
mistakes made off the field than for the plays on the field. The
current malaise that afflicts baseball is epitomized by the new
names that have recently become so prominently associated with
the game: Fehr, Finley, Giles, Miller, Ravitch and Steinbrenner. 5 As
the noted baseball executive Bill Veeck once commented,
"[b]aseball must be a truly wonderful sport to survive all that is
done to it."
Baseball's troubles derive from its enormous and continuing
popularity. As supposedly amateur teams began to provide "supple-
ments" of one sort or another to ensure that they would keep their
best players, the best teams were gradually transformed into fully
5. See generally DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER: THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL (1992);
GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1989); ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME (1992).
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professional teams, a process completed by 1870. These teams,
while generally identifying themselves with particular home towns,
lived on the road, playing whomever they could line up in a loosely
organized National Association of Baseball Players, and sharing the
proceeds of their games among the players. When enterprising
men began to build large stadiums to house the games, they quickly
realized that to assure enough games to enable them to obtain an
adequate return on their investment they would have to gain con-
trol of the teams and their players. The result was the organization
of the National League of Baseball Clubs in 1876, in which the own-
ers of the stadiums owned the teams and employed the players for
fixed salaries.
The National League, along with its companion American
League (organized in 1901), long maintained strict control over
baseball franchises and players. By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, organized baseball had already created a hierarchy of leagues,
and by the 1930s, minor league teams had been reduced to little
more than appendages of the major league team with which they
had "working relationships." From 1876 to 1976, the centerpiece of
league control was the "reserve clause," whereby a player was bound
for life to the team with which he had signed a valid contract. The
only way a player could change teams would be through the assign-
ment of his contract by the team to which he was bound, known as
a "sale" or a "trade," or by an "unconditional release" by the team to
which the player was bound - this was a possibility seldom realized
unless the player was no longer capable of significant athletic
achievement. See Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa.
1902). In other words, baseball, for most of its history, has been
organized in a rigid monopoly structure that enables the owners of
the teams to divide the markets for their product, while exercising
near complete dominance over its production and distribution and
related activities on and off the field.
Recent years have seen considerable changes in this structure,
beginning with the divorce, in most cities, of team ownership from
stadium ownership. 6 With this change, the major capital invest-
6. See CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996) (upholding constitutional-
ity of tax subsidy for new stadium to be built in Seattle); DEAN V. BAIM, THE SPORTS
STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT (1994); CHARLES C. EUCHNER, PLAYING THE
FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE AND CITIES FIGHT TO KEEP THEM (1993); MARTINJ.
GREENBERG &JAMES T. GRAY, THE STADIUM GAME (1996); KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE,
THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PURSUIT OF SPORTS FRANCHISES, EVENTS,
STADIUMS, AND ARENAS (1995); DAVID WHITFORD, PLAYING HARDBALL: THE HIGH-
STAKES BATTLE FOR BASEBALL'S NEW FRANCHISES (1993); David Burke, The Stop Tax-
Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEG. 149 (1997) (arguing for prohibition of
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ment in the sport was no longer the physical structure (which is
now generally financed by the taxpayers), but the cost of buying an
existing team or of buying into the closed club of one of the major
leagues on those rare occasions when a league expands. Following
this change, the reserve clause system was discarded as a result of
collective bargaining by the Major League Baseball Players' Associa-
tion.7 The reserve clause system was replaced by a complex set of
rules known as "free agency," that bind players to the first team with
which they have signed until they have played for six years in the
major leagues and, thereafter, for the duration of generally long-
term contracts separately negotiated by each player. Economists
and lawyers may continue to debate whether this change actually
changed the teams for which stars play, but fans know the answer.8
publicly subsidized stadiums); Wayne Eastman, "Everything's Up for Grabs": The
Coasean Story in Game-Theoretic Terms, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 23 (1996) (describing
"threat-bargaining" between baseball team owners and cities used to extract new
stadiums or other benefits from public); Lars G. Gustafsson, "Lessening the Burdens
of Government ": Formulating a Test for Uniformity and Rational Federal Income Tax Subsi-
dies, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 787, 824-27, 834-35 (1997) (discussing tax implications of
public subsidies for baseball, often in form of publicly financed stadiums); Myreon
Sony Hodur, Note, Ball Four: The IRS Walks the Kansas City Royals, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 483 (1997) (discussing favorable inheritance tax rulings regard-
ing estate of owner of Royals).
7. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). See generallyJAMES B. DWORKIN, OWNERS VER-
sus PLAYERS: BASEBALL AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1981); LEE LOWENFISH, THE
IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS (1991); Marc Chalpin,
Comment, It Ain't Over 'til It's Over: The Century Long Conflict Between the Owners and
the Players in Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REV. 205 (1996); Peter N. Katz, A
History of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?,
15 COMp. LAB. L.J. 371 (1994); Robert McComick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Tri-
umph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1982).
8. See David A. Besanko & Daniel Simon, Resource Allocation in the Baseball
Player's Labor Market: An Empirical Investigation, REV. Bus. & ECON. RES., Fall 1985, at
71; Donald J. Cymrot & James A. Dunleavy, Are Free Agents Perspicacious Per-
egrinators?, 69 REV. ECON. STAT. 50 (1987); DonaldJ. Cymrot, Migration Trends and
Earnings of Free Agents in Major League Baseball, 1976-1979, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 545
(1983); George Daly & William J. Moore, Externalitites, Property Rights and the Alloca-
tion of Resources in Major League Baseball, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 77 (1981);James Richard
Hill, The Threat of Free Agency and Exploitation in Professional Baseball: 1976-1979, 25
Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 68 (Winter 1985); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Produc-
tion Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 684 (1979);
Matthew Spitzer & Elizabeth Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1202-08 (1980);
Mark Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brief Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1215, 1215-18 (1980); Eric Leifer, Endogenizing Context: Opportunity, Organization,
and Dealmaking in Major League Baseball, 23 Soc. Sci. REs. 263 (1994); Roger Noll,
The Economics of Sports Leagues, in 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 17-
1, 17-26 (Gary A. Uberstine ed. 1988); Philip Porter, Market Advantage as Rent: Do
Professional Teams in Larger Markets Have a Competitive Advantage?, in 1 ADVANCES IN
THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 237 (Gerald W. Scully ed. 1992); John Vrooman, A Gen-
eral Theory of Professional Sports Leagues, 61 S. ECON. J. 971 (1995).
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The Leagues continue to enforce the traditional market allocation
aspects of their activities as well as the terms and conditions of the
free agency system.
Over the years, the two leagues in cooperation with each other
have taken on additional major functions. The two leagues jointly
elect a "Baseball Commissioner" who, among other functions, ad-
ministers national television and radio contracts and a national par-
aphernalia marketing organization. See generally Jonathan M.
Reinsdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in Baseball, 7 Marq. Sports
L.J. 211 (1996). The proceeds of the annual All Star Game, the two
League Series, and the World Series, as well as a number of nation-
ally televised regular season games (on both broadcast and cable
networks) are divided equally among the twenty-eight teams. This
income peaked in 1993 at about $1,400,000,000, and, although it
has fallen off since 1994, it remains the largest source of income for
even the wealthiest teams. A similar, albeit considerably less lucra-
tive, contract pertains to national radio broadcasts. The sale of
team baseballs, bats, shirts, hats, helmets, and similar paraphernalia
are also licensed by the Commissioner's office, as is the right to use
the official baseball logo on various commercial promotions. These
licenses are also not as lucrative as the television income. The in-
come from these sales and licenses is also divided equally among
the twenty-eight teams. The separate income of the teams, from
ticket and concession sales in the stadium in which the game is
played and from local radio and television broadcasting rights, is as
much as 50% of the total income of the team in a few of the largest
markets, around 40% for most teams, and less than 30% for some
teams in smaller markets. Thus, even before the recent proposals
to share local television and radio revenues, major league baseball
was already characterized by a substantial amount of revenue shar-
ing and marketing integration. Some commentators seem to over-
look this reality. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to
the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing Work ?, 5 Seton Hall J. Sport
L. 419 (1995).
As this brief description indicates, the structure of organized
baseball would appear to the uninitiated to be the kind of classic
monopoly structure that the antitrust laws of this country were
designed to eliminate, or at least to regulate. Yet, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing on behalf of a unanimous court in one of
his typically brief opinions, has told us that baseball involves the
staging of an exhibition for paying customers, an activity that takes
place entirely within a single state, and thus does not form part of
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interstate commerce. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Na-
tional League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 9 As Judge
Waterman wrote nearly fifty years later, this "was not one of Justice
Holmes' happiest days." Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir.
1971). That the result was incongruous to say the least, even when
delivered, was apparent from Justice Holmes' opinion itself, in
which he twice acknowledged that the discipline of the league re-
quired nearly constant travel by players across state lines at the ex-
pense of their employers, to play games in cities far from home. See
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 312, 392-95 (1997).
Holmes' conclusion appears even more incongruous in an age
of multi-million dollar deals with television networks, of fairly medi-
ocre free agents making in a year as much as Ty Cobb, Lou Gehrig,
Rogers Hornsby, Christy Mathewson, Walter Johnson, Babe Ruth
and Cy Young made in their entire careers combined, and of cities
engaged in bidding wars to entice teams from other cities to pick
up and move across state lines. Still, the Supreme Court has af-
firmed this holding on the three occasions that the issue has
reached the Court. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 278 (1972); United States
v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953). The incongruity of this holding is reinforced
when one discovers that this exemption of baseball from the anti-
trust laws of the United States has been denied to professional foot-
ball and basketball, as well as to "amateur" athletics. 10
In fact, the Supreme Court itself has described the exemption
of baseball from the antitrust laws as "unrealistic," "inconsistent"
and "illogical." Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957). The
only reason given for reaffirming the rule in both Toolson and Flood
has been the long continued reliance of baseball owners on the
rule, along with the continued acquiescence of Congress in the re-
9. See also American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1914).
10. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984); Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445
(1957); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Chicago Prof'I Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1991); United States Football League v.
NFL, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving award of attorney's fees); Fishman v.
Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). See generally Chalpin, supra note 7; Robert C.
Heintel, Note, The Need for an Alternative to Antitrust Regulation of the National Football
League, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1033 (1996); Michael Tannenbaum, A Comprehen-
sive Analysis of Recent Antitrust and Labor Litigation Affecting the NBA and NFL, 3
SPoRTs LAwJ. 205 (1996).
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sult. Flood, 407 U.S. at 280-84; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 79. To complete
the uniquely privileged status of baseball in our legal, as well as, our
general culture, lower courts have concluded that notwithstanding
the holding that organized baseball did not constitute interstate
commerce for purposes of applying the federal antitrust laws, or-
ganized baseball was too involved with interstate commerce to en-
able states to apply their local antitrust laws to the sport. Flood, 443
F.2d at 266-68; State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis.
1966).
These decisions have created, perhaps unwittingly, a peculiar
national institution. Some have argued against the wisdom of de-
ferring to a busy Congress the question of whether the Supreme
Court has played the right game or according to the right rules
regarding baseball and antitrust. See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial
Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust
Laws, 14 Hous. L. Rev. 611, 611-12 (1977). Nonetheless, we must
confront the parties and their contentions in this case within the
rules set down by the Supreme Court.
III. THE LiNEuP
The parties to this suit are the frustrated would-be owners of
the Phoenix Phillies on the one side, and the present owners of the
several baseball clubs in the National League and two groups whom
the League recognizes as the past and present owners of the Phila-
delphia Phillies (the Philadelphia National Baseball Club, Inc. and
Philadelphia Baseball Renaissance, Inc.) on the other side. We
need only note here that the parties named in this suit actually
form a team of numerous actual players most of whom, like most
baseball players, are more or less anonymous journeymen who play
their positions at the margins of fame and upon retirement recede
quickly from public consciousness. Few of these lesser players will
appear by name in this opinion.
As the names of the two specific teams should suggest, this dis-
pute grows out of an attempted sale of the Philadelphia Phillies to a
group of investors based in Phoenix, Arizona. It is worth taking a
brief look at the line up of the parties and at how this sorry state of
affairs came to pass. We begin with the Phillies, the team which two
cities now love to hate.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has been the home of a long and
honorable baseball tradition, having fielded a team in the National
League in its first year of operation (1876), and, after a brief lapse,
having been in the league continuously since 1883. From 1901 to
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1954, the city was home to a second team as well - the Philadel-
phia Athletics (A's) of the American League. In fact, during this
period the Athletics were the major team in the city, twice dominat-
ing their league, winning nine pennants and five World Series with
teams that still are counted among the best of all time. Philadel-
phia also had the distinction of seeing its two teams combine for
more last place finishes than any other city in organized baseball,
including a remarkable (and unmatched) nine years in which both
teams finished last in their respective leagues. This peculiar mix of
greatness and frustration left Philadelphia fans with a deserved rep-
utation as harsh critics of anything less than perfection on the field,
as even the best players on Philadelphia teams have learned when
they experienced occasional slumps.
Until World War II, the Phillies in fact were a pretty sad story,
rarely rising above the bottom half of the league. In 1930, the Phil-
lies even achieved the highest team batting average, .316, in the
twentieth century, while finishing dead last. During a brief interval
after World War II, however, the Phillies gathered a group of young
players known as "the Whiz Kids," who managed to win a pennant
and keep the team in contention at a time when the Philadelphia
A's were in sharp decline. The timing of this shift in the relative
fortunes of the two teams had significant consequences, for this co-
incided with the opening of the era of franchise shifting. After the
1954 baseball season, Philadelphia lost its then weaker team just as
Boston had lost the Braves after 1952, as St. Louis had lost the
Browns after 1953, and as Brooklyn and New York would lose the
Dodgers and Giants after 1957.
As the only team in town, the Phillies continued to demon-
strate extremes of achievement. In several years, the team estab-
lished marks for futility known throughout baseball: twenty-three
consecutive losses in 1961, a late-season collapse of legendary pro-
portions in 1964 and a team that finished dead last with a pitcher
who lead the major leagues in victories by a wide margin (in 1972,
Steve Carlton, won twenty-seven games). The Phillies' prospects in
the early 1970s were so bleak that Curt Flood, who was then the
premiere centerfielder in baseball, was so determined not to be-
come a Phillie, after he was traded by St. Louis to Philadelphia, that
he fought all the way to the Supreme Court in an effort to void the
reserve clause and obtain the right to determine for himself where
he would play. The result was the decision in Flood, that figures so
prominently in this suit. He lost and retired, rather than come to
Philadelphia.
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On the other hand, the Phillies did reward their suffering fans
with some outstanding years. These included the Phillies' only
World Series win in 1980 and four other first place finishes between
1976 and 1983. Finally, in 1993, the Phillies surprised themselves,
the city and the continent by winning the National League pen-
nant, only to lose the World Series under circumstances that made
for yet another emotionally draining failure.
As indicated, the Phillies have been members of the National
League of Baseball Clubs for more than a century, and seem des-
tined to continue as a member of the National League (League)
regardless of in which city they play. The League was formed in
1876 and operates under the same basic structure today, despite its
growth from a low of six teams to the present fourteen. The
League is comprised of the owners of the baseball teams, today gen-
erally corporations or limited partnerships set up for that specific
purpose. The League schedules games, provides umpires and gen-
erally enforces a complicated set of rules regarding both on-field
and off-field behavior of owners, players and related personnel.
These activities enable the League to determine the winners of the
two divisions (as the two major leagues were structured during the
time the events to be related below occurred), and to organize a
National Series to determine the League champion. The League
champion, known as "the pennant winner," represents the League
in the World Series that crowns the baseball season every October.
The World Series is such a national institution that it was not inter-
rupted for world wars, the depression, or an earthquake, although
it was canceled in 1994 because of a players' strike - a blow that
some believe has permanently tarnished the sport's image.
Probably the most important, and certainly the most controver-
sial, function of the League is to award or withdraw "franchises"
from owners, although the latter has not happened since 1943,
when the ownership of the Phillies was declared vacant because of
gambling by the owner. The team was taken under receivership by
the League until the Carpenter family purchased the team. The
National League requires that any change of a franchise, including
the awarding of a new franchise, be approved by three-quarters of
the owners in the League. Before 1992, the National League re-
quired unanimous approval. The 1992 reforms also required an
approval by a majority of the owners in the American League which
similarly has fourteen teams. In addition, the Baseball Commis-
sioner (Commissioner) has the power under his authority to act "in
the best interests of baseball," to intervene in this process to over-
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rule a decision of either or both leagues. One court aptly described
the Commissioner as having "all the attributes of a benevolent but
absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial
paterfamilias." Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D.
Ill. 1931). Organized baseball has even required compensation for
the movement of a higher level team into the "territory" of a lower
level team. See Peter W. Billings, Sr., Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards Is Limited, 10 Utah BJ. 15 (1997).
Some would treat the ownership of a baseball franchise as a
sort of public trust for the benefit of the community to which the
franchise is assigned, requiring a strong showing of lack of commu-
nity support before a move could be approved. See Daniel S. Mason
& Trevor Slack, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice?
Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 Marq.
Sports LJ. 399 (1997). While that does not appear to be true for
other professional sports, moving a baseball team involves overcom-
ing considerable hurdles that are by no means proforma. More than
one proposed move before the one involved in this case has been
denied by the responsible league, forcing the sale of the team to a
new owner willing to keep the team in place.
For Phoenix or any other city to receive a new franchise
through yet another round of expansion would require the affirma-
tive vote of the owners of at least eleven of the fourteen existing
National League teams and a majority (eight of fourteen) of the
American League owners. The same margins of approval would be
necessary to transfer a franchise from one city to another, as was
attempted in this case. Finally, the Commissioner would have to
refrain from voiding the expansion, sale or transfer. At the present
time, the office of Baseball Commissioner is vacant, and thus the
powers of the Commissioner have neither been exercised relative to
nor called into question in this proceeding.
Finally, we come to the would-be Phoenix Phillies. This is a
corporation established by a group of investors centered in Phoe-
nix, Arizona, in the American southwest. The principal investors
were two owners of car dealerships in the Phoenix area, who had no
personal involvement in organized baseball before the events about
to be related. They have been passionate fans of the game since
their youth, and long hoped to be able to bring a major league
team to their adopted hometown.
17
Dellapenna: The Phoenix Phillies v. the Philadelphia Phillies: A Recently Dis
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
250 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOuRNAL
IV. THE PLAY-BY-PLAY
The troubles with the Phillies began with the sharp decline in
Philadelphia's baseball fortunes after a group of investors, headed
by Warren Giles as managing general partner, purchased the team
in 1981. At that point, the Phillies, as indicated above, had un-
doubtedly the most successful decade in their history. They had
enough momentum from that period to go to the World Series in
1983, to stay in contention for several years and to finish as high as
second in their division in 1986. We need not recite here the series
of disastrous trades and failures to sign free agents that dropped
the team to last in their division in 1987. Suffice it to say, between
1987 and 1992, the team returned to the tradition of unrelieved
failure on a scale unknown in Philadelphia for twenty years.
Fans became verbally and occasionally physically abusive to the
teams that Warren Giles put on the field. As attendance fell mark-
edly, Giles let it be known that the team was in dire financial straits.
He stated that he would entertain offers to buy a controlling inter-
est in the Philadelphia National Baseball Club by potential owners
who would keep the team in the city of Philadelphia. This control-
ling interest consisted of the shares of Warren Giles and of most of
the other partners, altogether some 86% of the present ownership
interests.
Apparently no investors interested in keeping the team in Phil-
adelphia came forward. At some point, the Phoenix group entered
the game. Secret negotiations began in 1991 and, after fits and
starts spread over nearly two years, culminated in a contract of sale
that was contingent upon the parties being able to obtain the neces-
sary approval by the National and American Leagues. Sometime
during this period, the informally organized group of would-be buy-
ers transformed themselves into a corporation under the name of
the Phoenix Phillies, Inc.
The contract was signed by the parties on March 15, 1993, with
a price of $212,000,000 to be paid for all the assets of the Philadel-
phia National League Baseball Club, including its membership in
the National League. As the League could not approve the sale and
transfer until, at the earliest, the mid-year meeting of the League in
July, the parties agreed to keep existence of this contract a closely
guarded secret until after the 1993 World Series, in order to avoid
the probable adverse effect on Philadelphia's attendance during
the coming year. We all know what happened in 1993.11
11. Editor's note: I have been unable to determine what happened in 1993.
[Vol. 5: p. 233
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/2
1998] "THE PHOENIX PHILLIES V. THE PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES" 251
With some investors in the Philadelphia club dissenting from
the proposed sale, rumors began to circulate in the city during the
summer. During 1993, Philadelphia's Mayor Rendell quietly under-
took to find local investors to purchase the Philadelphia National
Baseball Club, building on the core of existing investors who did
not want to sell, or at least did not want to sell to a group that would
leave the city. This effort was just beginning to come to fruition
when the Phoenix Phillies, Inc., made a surprise announcement of
their deal on Tuesday, October 26, only three days after Mitch Wil-
liams' last pitch as a Phillie. The news conference in Phoenix pro-
duced predictable consternation in Philadelphia.
On November 3, a Philadelphia-based group, under the name
of Philadelphia Baseball Renaissance, Inc., (Renaissance) made
public an offer of $234,000,000 and presented it, with much fan-
fare, to Warren Giles. This offer was made possible in part by a deal
Renaissance made to renegotiate the team's lease on Veterans Sta-
dium and promises from state and local government to help fi-
nance a new "baseball-only" stadium within ten years. The
concessions that the city was willing to make to the new buyers were
expected to be worth approximately $8,000,000 to $10,000,000 per
year for the twenty-five year life of the new lease.
After the announcement of the Renaissance bid, Mr. Giles de-
clared that he personally would prefer to see the team remain in
Philadelphia, but that the outcome would depend upon the action
of the owners to be taken at their annual meeting in December in
Las Vegas, Nevada. Considerable press attention now focused on
the impending meeting. Both the Phoenix Phillies and Renais-
sance made formal presentations on the merits of their respective
offers to ajoint meeting of the American and National League own-
ers. Sometime later, the two leagues met separately in closed meet-
ings to deliberate the matter, with the American League owners
postponing any decision until after the National League owners
should vote. Although Warren Giles had absented himself from the
meeting in which the formal presentations were made, he did par-
ticipate in the meeting of the National League owners to debate
and decide whether to approve the sale to the Phoenix group. The
National League owners ultimately voted to deny approval of the
sale by a vote of eight in favor of the sale to six against.
Immediately after this result was announced, Giles met with
the Renaissance representatives and signed a contract to sell the
team to them for $234,000,000. Thereafter, the National League
owners voted unanimously to approve the sale to Renaissance, as
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did the American League owners. The entire matter was settled
within forty-eight hours of the rejection of the sale to the Phoenix
Phillies.
V. THE DISPUTED CALL
The Phoenix Phillies brought this suit to vindicate their
claimed rights to purchase the Philadelphia Phillies and to bring
them to Phoenix. The Phoenix Phillies allege that the National
League owners conspired to restrain trade by excluding the appel-
lant from the Phoenix market area and to establish monopoly con-
trol of the marketing of baseball in the entire United States in
violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, depriv-
ing the appellant of its opportunity to engage in the business of
baseball in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
The two statutes plaintiff invokes in this case are deceptively
simple in their phrasing. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in
relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any con-
tract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished.
Section 2 provides "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony."
The appellant prays for an award of damages and an injunc-
tion against what it characterizes as a continuing violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The effect of this injunction,
were it to be granted, would be to order the transfer of the Phillies
to Phoenix. The appellant joined the Philadelphia National Base-
ball Club and Philadelphia Baseball Renaissance, Inc., as defend-
ants because the injunction that the appellant seeks will operate
directly on those defendants. No reason appears why the appellant
did not join the American League; we surmise that appellant con-
siders that it will acquire complete relief by proceeding against the
named parties. No one has raised the question of whether the
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American League is a necessary party to this proceeding and we do
not reach that question.
The appellees denied the allegations against them. After vari-
ous motions were made, the parties met with DistrictJudge William
Eckert in a pre-trial conference in which they agreed to a stipulated
set of facts that form the basis for much that has been set forth
above. On the basis of these stipulated facts, the appellant and the
appellees both moved for summary judgment under section 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that each movant was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.
After a hearing on the motions, Judge Eckert entered a sum-
mary judgment on February 14, 1994, in favor of the appellees.
Judge Eckert dismissed the case on the basis of the exemption of
baseball from the application of the Sherman Act, and provided an
additional ground for his judgment in his conclusion that as a mat-
ter of law, the National League operates as a partnership of four-
teen "owners" who constitute a single entity, and therefore cannot
be found to have conspired with themselves in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. Finally, on the basis of San Francisco Seats, Ltd.
v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1974), Judge Eckert held
that the target of any unlawful monopolization under section 2 of
the Sherman Act would be any attempt to organize a third major
baseball league. As appellant was not a member of a third league
and did not plan to join such a league, Judge Eckert held that the
appellant lacked standing under section 2. The Phoenix Phillies,
perfected this appeal to challenge the dismissal of its antitrust
claims.
VI. THE OFFIcIAL RULING
We reverse Judge Eckert's order. Federal Baseball represents an
outmoded concept of intrastate commerce thoroughly discredited
by the New Deal cases that expanded the scope of the commerce
power. We predict that the Supreme Court would so hold today,
and thus hold in this case that organized baseball is not immune
from the application of the Sherman Act.
We need not rest on this ground, however. Each case to reach
the Supreme Court from Federal Baseball to Flood has involved the
reserve clause. In Federal Baseball, the plaintiff alleged that the re-
serve clause was the instrumentality by which the American and Na-
tional Leagues carried out their conspiracy to exclude the plaintiff
from the marketplace. In Toolson and Flood, the plaintiffs were play-
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ers seeking to overturn the reserve clause system. The effect of the
Flood decision was to limit the precedential value of Federal Baseball
to disputes involving the reserve clause. See Piazza v. Major League
Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v. National
League of Prof l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). Given
that the reserve clause no longer exists, this reading of the prece-
dents at last subjects the baseball industry to the same laws that ap-
ply to every other industry in the United States.
We also reverse Judge Eckert's decision regarding whether the
National League of Baseball Clubs constitutes a single entity. It per-
haps goes without saying that one cannot conspire with oneself, yet
application of the point is not always self-evident when a corporate
structure consists of more than one affiliated corporation. The
Supreme Court has made clear that this premise applies to corpo-
rate activities involving entities that are organized as separate cor-
porations, yet are integrated in fact into a single firm consisting of a
parent and one or more subsidiaries. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclu-
sive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1
(1995).
This case poses the question of whether a professional sports
league constitutes a single entity or an unlawful conspiracy. In Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined that question exhaustively in a suit challenging the Na-
tional Football League's (NFL) denial of approval to Al Davis' move
of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. See Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). In that case,
the court not only concluded that the NFL was not a "single entity,"
but that its denial of market entry to a particular applicant was a per
se unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. We are persuaded that this same reason-
ing applies to the actions of the National League in denying
approval to the transfer of the Phillies to Phoenix.1 2 Absent any
12. See also North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982);
Sean H. Brogan, "Who Are These Colts?": The Likelihood of Confusion, Consumer Survey
Evidence and Trademark Abandonment in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Baltimore Metro.
Football Club, Ltd., 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 39 (1996); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust,
and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1989); Michael S. Jacobs, Profes-
sional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo,
67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Reex-
amining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 953 (1988); Katherine C. Leone,
Note, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football League, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1997); Daniel S. Mason & Trevor Slack, Appropriate Opportu-
nism or Bad Business Practice? Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the Franchise Relocation
Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 399 (1997); Sanjay Jos6 Mullick, Browns to Baltimore:
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further considerations not evident on this record, our decision will
require the trial court both to award damages and to grant the in-
junction requested by the appellant.
Nothing in this opinion contradicts the fact that all sports en-
joy the same antitrust exemptions that are available to businesses
generally, such as the exemption of labor negotiations and agree-
ments. 13 Given our decision relating to section 1 of the Sherman
Act, we do not reach the question of whetherJudge Eckert correctly
decided the question of standing under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
FORD FRICK, District Judge sitting by designation, concurs.
A.B. CHANDLER, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
VII. THE PROTEST
I dissent from both conclusions reached by the majority. I
here indicate only the barest outline of my reasons.
While the decisions regarding the exemption of baseball from
the application of the antitrust laws are difficult to justify today, the
rule is far too well established for us to overturn it. Nor can I ac-
cept the appellant's argument that baseball's antitrust exemption is
limited to employment disputes dependent upon the reserve
clause. Although the two more recent Supreme Court decisions on
this issue (Toolson and food) both involved employment disputes,
Federal Baseball itself did not. Federal Baseball rather arose from just
the sort of franchise dispute involved in this case. There is no
ground for finding that the holding of Federal Baseball, or its reaffir-
mation in Toolson and Flood are limited to litigation involving a non-
Franchise Free Agency and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1 (1996);
Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks,
39 EMORY L.J. 463, 465-68 (1990).
13. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); NBA v. Williams, 45
F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations
Comm., Inc., 67 F.3d. 1054 (2d Cir. 1995); Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in
Professional Sports, 1989 DuKE L.J. 339; Charles D. Marvine, Baseball's Unilaterally
Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball Cap Doesn't Fit, 43 KAN. L. REv. 625 (1995); Note,
Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption,
104 HARv. L. REv. 874 (1991); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Anti-
trust Policy: The Special Case of Sports Leagues Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19
(1986).
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existent clause in employment contracts that have been trans-
formed beyond recognition from the contracts involved in the lat-
ter two cases.1 4 I am unimpressed by the two recent decisions
limiting the antitrust exemption to the reserve clause. See Piazza,
831 F. Supp. at 420; Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1021. These decisions
have no precedential authority in this court, and are simply wrong.
See McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D.
Wash. 1995).
Nor can I accept the conclusion that the National League of
Baseball Clubs is not a single entity. This question was considered
at length by the Third Circuit in other cases involving professional
football and in a district court case involving professional hockey.
See Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.
1986); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The
football cases involved the denial of an expansion franchise and the
hockey case involved the denial of an application to transfer a
franchise. In each case, the court concluded that no conspiracy or
unlawful monopolization occurred because the actions involved
were actions of a single entity rather than of a conspiracy. 15
As in the case of professional sports leagues, when what is be-
ing marketed is competition itself, there must be rules to govern
that competition and some organization not only to provide those
rules but also to enforce them. That is all that the National League
of Baseball Clubs purports to do here. An additional relevant fact is
that the shared-revenue sources make up approximately 70% of the
total income of the teams of the league, and these revenues are
shared equally among the fourteen teams. I conclude therefore
that the League is a partnership designed to assure honest and bal-
anced competition among its members in order to maximize the
14. See also Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832
F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987); Professional Baseball Schs. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693
F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.
1978); Salerno v. American League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.
1970); Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 282 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960); Postema
v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
15. See also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey
v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Myron G. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH.
L. REv. 1 (1983); Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REv. 562 (1986);John C.
Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Coop-
eration in the Sports Industry, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1013.
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income of the entire league as a single enterprise. Given this con-
clusion, there simply is no possibility of a conspiracy among com-
petitors as opposed to the ongoing management of a single
business enterprise.
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